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MARYLAND'S CHILD PORNOGRAPHY STATUTE HOLDS
PHOTOGRAPHERS STRICTLY LIABLE FOR THE USE OF
UNDER-AGE SUBJECTS BUT LEAVES OPEN THE
POSSIBILITY OF THE MISTAKE OF AGE DEFENSE.
Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 641 A.2d 870 (1994).
I. INTRODUCTION
There exists a delicate balance between citizens' First Amendment
protections and the states' power to regulate speech in an effort to
shelter children from the dangers of pornography. Many states have
responded to the problems of child pornography by enacting legis-
lation criminalizing the production and distribution of such materi-
als.' In an attempt to eradicate pornography's harmful effects on
1. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation making
criminal the production of materials depicting minors engaged in sexually
explicit activity. See ALA. CODE § 13A-12-197 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.123
(Supp. 1995); AEIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3508 (1989 & Supp. 1995); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-27-303 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.3
(West 1988 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-403 (West 1990);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-196a (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1108 (1989 & Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2012 (1989); FLA. STAT.
ch. 27.071 (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100 (1992 & Supp. 1995); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 707-750 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 18-1506 (1987 & Supp. 1995);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 720 para. 5/11-20.1 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-49-3-2
(Burns 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 728.12 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3516 (Supp. 1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 531.320 to .370
(Baldwin 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2921-2923 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A (1993); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 29A-
29B (West 1990); MICH. Com'. LAWS ANN. § 750.145(c)(3) (West 1991 & Supp.
1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.246 (1987); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-5-33 (Supp.
1995); Mo. REV. STAT. § 568.060 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-625 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1463.01 to .05 (1989); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.700-.760 (Michie 1992); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
650:2(11) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4(b) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-6-1 (1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 263.00-.15 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-190.6 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-27.1-02 to -03 (1985 &
Supp. 1991); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.321 (Baldwin 1993); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, § 1021.2 (1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.665-.695 (1993); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6312 (Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-9-1.1 (1994); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-15-335 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§
22-22-22 to -25 (1988 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-902 (1991);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.25 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-59-1 to
-4 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.7-374.1 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1995); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2822 (Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.68A.001
to .910 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE § 61-8C-3 (1992); WIs. STAT.
§ 940.203 (Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. § 27-6-114 (1995).
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children, the Maryland General Assembly has enacted article 27,
section 419A (section 419A).
2
In Outmezguine v. State' (Outmezguine III), a recent challenge
to section 419A, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that pho-
tographers were strictly liable for the use of minors as subjects and
declined to read a scienter element into the statute. 4 In so holding,
the court necessarily decided that the interests of protecting children
from sexual exploitation outweighed an individual's right to photo-
graph sexually explicit conduct.' In an effort to uphold the statute's
constitutionality, however, the court implied that the affirmative
defense of mistake of age may be available to one charged with
violating the statute.
6
The importance of Outmezguine III lies in the court's apparent
indifference to the restriction of expression historically protected by
the First Amendment. The court's alarming decision presents two
areas of concern to those engaged in the lawful activity of photo-
graphing adult sexually explicit conduct. Of foremost concern, the
court determined that Maryland's child pornography statute was a
strict liability offense despite its impact on First Amendment free-
doms. 7 Second, but more surprisingly, the court increased defendants'
burden of production for raising affirmative defenses by requiring
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A (1992) [hereinafter § 419A]. Pursuant to the
statute, a minor is defined as anyone under 18 years of age. Id. § 419A(a).
The statute makes criminal the photographing or filming of a minor engaged
in sexually explicit or obscene conduct. Id. § 419A(c). Convictions under the
statute carry maximum fines of $25,000, 10 years imprisonment or both. Id.
§ 419A(e)(l).
3. 335 Md. 20, 641 A.2d 870 (1994). The case decided by the Court of Appeals
of Maryland and the case decided by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
are identically named. Further references to the Maryland court of appeals's
opinion are identified as "Outmezguine III." Similarly, the Maryland court of
special appeals's decision is referenced as "Outmezguine II."
4. Outmezguine II, 335 Md. at 43, 641 A.2d at 882.
5. Id. at 38, 641 A.2d at 879. As defined by the Maryland legislature, sexual
conduct is "human masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any touching of or
contact with genitals, pubic areas or buttocks of the human male or female,
or the breasts of the female, whether alone or between members of the same
or opposite sex, or between humans and animals." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 416A(d) (1992 & Supp. 1994).
6. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 47, 641 A.2d at 883. While never expressly
assessing the validity of a mistake of age defense, the court determined that it
was "arguable" that the legislature intended to permit the defense of one
charged with violation of § 419A. Id.
7. Id. at 45, 641 A.2d at 883. Due to its determination that photographers were
in a better position to ascertain the age of photographic subjects, the court
proclaimed that photographers of explicit materials were entitled to less pro-
tection under the First Amendment than were distributors and consumers of
child pornography. See id. at 44, 641 A.2d at 882.
Outmezguine v. State
evidence beyond that historically required to preserve such an issue
for appeal.'
Elan Outmezguine, who was twenty-five years old at the time
of the incident in question, was in the home-cleaning business. 9 As
a hobby, Outmezguine occasionally photographed dancers and mod-
els. 10 Jennifer, the alleged victim, assisted Outmezguine on cleaning
jobs." During one such occasion, Jennifer saw an album of models
whom Outmezguine had recently photographed.' 2 After viewing the
photos, Jennifer expressed an interest in modeling and photography. 3
Jennifer's boyfriend ("R.C.") allegedly inquired about using Out-
mezguine's camera and equipment to take photographs of Jennifer.'
4
Outmezguine stated that he lent photographic equipment to R.C. but
was never personally involved in taking photos of Jennifer. 5
Jennifer, who was fifteen at the time, used drugs and alcohol
and was admittedly sexually promiscuous.' 6 She contended that Out-
mezguine promised her drugs and money in exchange for sex and
for posing for nude photographs.' 7 The photos depicted Jennifer in
various stages of undress.'8 In some photographs, Jennifer was touch-
ing her bare breasts and buttocks. 19 In one graphic photo, Jennifer
was portrayed lewdly displaying her genitalia. 20 Jennifer testified that
she posed for the defendant three times and that she had sexual
relations with him on multiple occasions. 2'
In January of 1991, Jennifer's mother, concerned about the
substantial change in her daughter's lifestyle, read Jennifer's diary
and discovered her daughter's substance abuse problem. 22 Jennifer
was subsequently admitted to an inpatient drug and alcohol rehabil-
itation program .23 While in treatment, Jennifer participated in coun-
8. Id. at 52, 641 A.2d at 886. During the trial, Outmezguine proffered the
following defenses: .'I did not take the pictures' and, in the alternative, 'I
did not know how old she was."' Id. at 51, 614 A.2d at 886.
9. Id. at 24, 641 A.2d at 872.
10. Id.
11. Outmezguine II, 97 Md. App. 151, 154, 627 A.2d 541, 542 (1993).
12. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 25 n.4, 641 A.2d at 872 n.4.
13. Id.
14. Id. Jennifer's boyfriend also worked with Appellant in his cleaning business.
Id.
15. Id. at 25, 641 A.2d at 873.
16. Id. at 24, 641 A.2d at 872.
17. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 26, 641 A.2d at 873. According to Outmezguine,
he and Jennifer never had any type of sexual involvement. Id. at 26 n.6, 641
A.2d at 873 n.6.
18. Id. at 26, 641 A.2d at 873.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 25-26, 641 A.2d at 873.




seling sessions, during which she confessed that she had engaged in
sexual relations with Outmezguine and had posed for the nude
photographs.24 Jennifer's counselor informed the police, who soon
thereafter obtained a search warrant for Outmezguine's residence.
2
1
Upon lawful execution of the warrant, the police found cameras,
lingerie, a photo album and loose photographs of Jennifer.
26
The police charged Outmezguine with violating section 419A.
27
At trial, Outmezguine challenged section 419A(c) as unconstitutional
because it did not require the state to prove that the defendant knew
that his subject was a minor. 2 During the two-day proceeding,
Outmezguine testified that he neither photographed Jennifer nor knew
her age. 29 However, and most importantly, Outmezguine failed to
claim that he thought Jennifer was at least eighteen years of age.30
At the conclusion of the proceeding, Defendant's counsel sub-
mitted four proposed jury instructions, all of which centered on the
requirement of a knowledge element to convict under section 419A.31
The circuit court rejected the proposed instructions and instructed
the jury that Maryland's child pornography statute did not contain
a knowledge element.12 The jury returned a guilty verdict, and
Outmezguine was sentenced to eight-years imprisonment.3"
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. Photos seized during the execution of the warrant depicted Jennifer engaged
in conduct proscribed by § 419A. Id.
27. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 27, 641 A.2d at 873.
28. Id. at 27, 641 A.2d at 874.
29. Id. at 27, 641 A.2d at 873. Jennifer testified that she had told "Outmezguine
her age and that she was a high school student." Id. at 27, 641 A.2d at 874.
30. Id. at 27, 641 A.2d at 873-74.
31. Id. at 28, 641 A.2d at 874. Outmezguine submitted the following proposed
instructions:
(1) The word 'knowingly' as used in a criminal statute, generally
speaking, means that state of mind which exists when the accused
person is in possession of facts under which he is aware he cannot
lawfully do a particular act, but nevertheless proceeds to do it. The
word 'scienter' is also sometimes used synonymously with 'knowledge.'
(2) "All the acts described in this Section are made criminal only if
they are committed knowingly."
(3) "Scienter or knowledge must be proven by the State."
(4) "Knowingly means having knowledge of the character and content
of the subject matter."
Id. at 27 n.7, 641 A.2d at 874 n.7.
32. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 28, 641 A.2d at 874. During deliberations, the
jury sent a note to the judge requesting clarification on the knowledge element.
The court reaffirmed to the jury that knowledge of the victim's age was not
an element of the offense. Id.
33. Id. at 23, 641 A.2d at 872.
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On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, in Out-
mezguine v. Statea4 (Outmezguine I]), affirmed the trial court's
determination that knowledge of a subject's age was not an element
of the offense." The court in Outmezguine II tracked the legislative
history of section 419A and opined that the General Assembly did
not intend to include a knowledge element for the crime of photo-
graphing minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.3 6 The court
explained that Outmezguine failed to raise the issue of mistake of





The Maryland General Assembly originally enacted section 419A
in 1978.38 Maryland's statute was passed in response to its federal
counterpart, enacted only three months prior.3 9
A review of the legislative history reveals that section 419A has
undergone at least two major changes since its inception.4 The first
round of changes to section 419A came in 1985 and 1986, in response
to the Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Ferber.4' At that
time, Maryland extended coverage of its child pornography regulation
to proscribe not only obscene materials involving minors but also
those materials depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct .42
34. Outmezguine v. State, 97 Md. App. 151, 627 A.2d 541 (1993). This case is
referenced in the text as Outmezguine II. See supra note 3.
35. Outmezguine II, 97 Md. App. at 165, 627 A.2d at 548.
36. Id. at 161-67, 627 A.2d at 546-49.
37. Id. at 167, 627 A.2d at 549.
38. Id. at 162, 627 A.2d at 546. This original legislation made it criminal to
"solicit, cause, induce, or 'knowingly permit' a child to appear as a subject
in an obscene photograph or film. Id.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., SENATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMMITTEE, BILL ANALYsIs OF S. 554,
1985 Sess. (Md. 1985); Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Bill Analysis
of H.R. 790, 1986 Sess. (1986); SENATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS CoMMITTEE,
BILL ANALYsIs OF H.B. 243, 1989 Sess. (Md. 1989).
41. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
42. S. 554, 1985 Sess. § 8 (Md. 1985); H.R. 790, 1986 Sess. § l(d) (Md. 1986).
In addition to extending coverage of the regulation to sexually explicit conduct,
the 1985 and 1986 amendments increased the fine for a violation of the statute
to a maximum of $25,000 and allowed the trier of fact to determine the age
of the photographic subject through means other than the direct testimony of




The legislature further amended section 419A in 1989. 41 The
amendment raised the age of those prohibited from appearing in
sexually explicit materials from sixteen and under to any age under
eighteen." The language of the 1989 amendment originally included
a provision that eliminated the availability of the affirmative defense
of mistake of age. 45 After reviewing testimony from the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) that denounced the provision as un-
constitutional, the legislature removed the limiting language from the
amendment."6
B. Case Law Survey
Historically, challenges to child pornography statutes have cen-
tered on the possible infringements of First Amendment protection.
47
In response to constitutional challenges, some courts have found it
necessary to delineate between protected and unprotected speech."
43. H.R. 243, 1989 Sess. (Md. 1989).
44. Id. § I(A). The legislature also increased the fine and incarceration period for
subsequent offenses to a maximum of $50,000 and 20 years imprisonment. Id.
§ I(E)(2).
45. Id. § I(E)(3). In response to the proposed amendment, the Attorney General's
office issued an opinion pursuant to a letter from Delegate Anne MacKinnon
in which she compared a proposed version of § 419A(c) to the text and judicial
decisions surrounding its federal counterpart. Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe,
Assistant Attorney General, to Delegate Anne MacKinnon (Feb. 20, 1989).
Therein, Kathryn M. Rowe, an Assistant Attorney General, opined that Mary-
land need not include knowledge as an element of the offense. Id. In addition,
the opinion declared that mistake of age need not be available as an affirmative
defense. Outmezguine II, 97 Md. App. at 165, 677 A.2d at 548.
46. Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20, 46-47, 641 A.2d 870, 883 (1994) (citing
Letter from Stuart Comstock-Gay, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties
Union of Maryland, to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (Feb. 7,
1989)). ACLU testimony was directed toward the proposed removal of the
mistake of age defense: "We believe the bill would unconstitutionally remove
any necessity of scienter from the section of the law, by stating that 'a mistake
of age is not a defense to prosecution under this section."' Id. Three weeks
after the ACLU's appearance, the legislature removed the limiting language.
Id. at 47, 641 A.2d 883.
47. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. "[Freedom of speech and of the press ... are among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); see also Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 569
A.2d 604, cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 (1990).
48. "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene." Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
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For example, in Roth v. United States49 the Supreme Court held that
"obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech
or press." 50 In Miller v. California,5" the Court attempted to clarify
the definition of obscenity for the purpose of identifying obscene
materials. 2 In its effort to further protect children from the dangers
of pornography, the Court, in New York v. Ferber, extended Miller
by including non-obscene, sexually explicit materials containing child
subjects in the category of unprotected speech.53
Although states have the authority to regulate unprotected speech,
they must avoid drafting regulations that have a chilling effect on
those individuals who would otherwise engage in lawful activities.1
4
To that end, statutes that regulate unprotected speech must be
narrowly drawn and must not unnecessarily infringe upon First
Amendment freedoms.
55
Regulations that chill speech are normally analyzed within the
rubric of the overbreadth doctrine.5 6 The overbreadth doctrine is a
remedy to statutes which impermissibly restrict First Amendment
protection.57 "In the First Amendment context, [defendants may]
challenge statutes on overbreadth grounds, regardless of whether the
individual defendant's conduct is constitutionally protected."" The
argument is that even though the challenger's actions are not pro-
tected, the statute is written so broadly as to have an unconstitutional,
chilling effect on those who would engage in lawful conduct.5 9
49. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
50. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485. The Court fashioned a definition of obscenity as
follows: "[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
the prurient interest." Id. at 489.
51. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
52. The Court created a three-part test to identify materials subject to regulation.
Id. at 24. The first prong of the test is the definition expounded in Roth v.
United States. See supra note 50. The second prong focused on work that
"depict[ed] or describe[d], in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specif-
ically defined by the applicable state law." Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. Finally, the
third prong targeted work that lacked "serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value." Id.
53. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 n.18 (1982).
54. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 36, 641 A.2d at 878.
55. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620,
637 (1980) (holding a local ordinance, which prohibited solicitation of contri-
butions where less than 75% of the proceeds were used for the charitable
purpose, unconstitutionally overbroad).
56. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990).
57. Id.
58. Id. at n.8.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249 (1953). When the doctrine is invoked, it necessitates that the
regulation be struck down or rewritten within constitutional tolerances. See
Baltimore Law Review
Maryland has held that only those regulations that substantially
impact upon protected expression will be held unconstitutional. 6°
Beyond the evaluation of the potential chilling effect on free
expression, courts often attempt to weigh an individual's right to
engage in protected speech against a state's interest in safeguarding
children. 6' The more a statute infringes upon personal liberties, the
greater a state's interest must be in order to preserve the regulation's
constitutionality. 62 In Ferber, the Court concluded that a state's
interest in protecting children from pornography was of "surpassing
importance. ' 6a The Court determined that the potential harm to
children was manifest and that New York State's interest in elimi-
nating the dissemination of child pornography outweighed the regu-
lation's nominal impact on the legal distribution of sexually explicit
materials .64
Once a court determines that a state has the right to regulate
certain forms of explicit media, the question turns to the nature and
language of the statute. In particular, most First Amendment chal-
lenges of criminal statutes that regulate pornographic material center
on the nature or lack of a scienter element. 65 Many courts have
declined to read scienter elements into child pornography statutes
that fail to address the issue. 6 Such regulations impose strict liability
on one convicted of engaging in the proscribed activity .6
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112. For this reason, it is infrequent that an overbreadth
challenge is successful. See id.
60. Curran v. Price, 334 Md. 149, 167, 638 A.2d 93, 102 (1994). The Price court
defined "substantial impact" situations as those in which there exists "'realistic
danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise' recognized First
Amendment rights." Id. (quoting Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984)).
61. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982).
62. Id. at 756-57.
63. Id. at 757. In describing New York's responsibility for the welfare of its
children, the state explained: "The care of children is a sacred trust." Id.
64. Id.
65. See generally United States v. Brown, 862 F.2d 1033 (3rd Cir. 1988) (holding
that the scienter element in the federal law proscribing the purchase of child
pornography merely requires knowledge of the character of the material);
United States v. Kleiner, 663 F. Supp. 43 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that the
knowledge element of the federal statute prohibiting the transportation and
distribution of child pornography does not refer to the age of the actors
contained in such material).
66. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal.,
858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that in determining the culpability of
adult film manufacturers, knowledge of age need not be an element of the
offense but that there must exist the availability of the affirmative defense of
mistake of age); State v. Fan, 445 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming
a conviction against an adult night club owner and holding that neither
[Vol. 25
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Challengers of strict liability regulations often request that the
judiciary read a knowledge element into the offense. 61 In recent cases,
Maryland courts have read scienter elements into offenses only when
necessary to correct inadvertent omissions of the legislature. 69 Con-
versely, Maryland courts have allowed strict liability offenses to stand
when it is clear that the legislature intended the regulation to be
applied in such a manner.70
While some courts have permitted strict liability regulations,
other courts have held that it is improper to impose criminal liability
without some level of knowledge of criminal conduct. 71 In the context
of anti-pornography statutes, many jurisdictions require only knowl-
edge of the nature and character of the proscribed material and not
knowledge of age as an element of the offense. 72 Because at least
some level of knowledge is required, these offenses take on only a
pseudo-strict liability flavor. In an effort to maintain the constitu-
tionality of these pseudo-strict liability offenses, some jurisdictions
knowledge of age nor the affirmative defense as to mistake of age are included
in the statute).
67. See United States Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 858 F.2d at 536.
68. E.g., id.
69. See, e.g., State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451, 583 A.2d 250 (1991) (reading a
scienter element into a statute criminalizing driving with a suspended driver's
license by finding that the legislature intended, but had neglected, to expressly
define a scienter element); Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 547 A.2d 1041
(1988) (reading a scienter element into a statute criminalizing the possession of
a controlled dangerous substance when the court determined that the statute
had an implied knowledge requirement of the presence and general character
of a controlled dangerous substance).
70. See Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797 (1993). The court in Garnett
considered a challenge to Maryland's statutory rape provision. Id. In deter-
mining that the legislature intended to impose strict criminal liability, the court
noted that adjacent subsections of the criminal statute expressly included a
scienter element whereas the subsection in question did not. Id. at 585-88.
71. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (comparing a similar
limitation on obscenity provisions). In 1992, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that the federal child pornography statute was
facially unconstitutional because it lacked any requirement of scienter. United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285, 1288-92 (9th Cir. 1992). The
Supreme Court recently overturned the Ninth Circuit's determination. United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994). The Court reversed
the prior decision because it found that the knowledge requirement of the first
subsection of the statute modified the remaining prohibitive subsections, thereby
maintaining the constitutionality of the provision. Id.
72. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). The Court affirmed the
conviction of a group of defendants charged with attempting to distribute an
illustrated government report on pornography. Id. at 97. The Court held that
it was sufficient that the distributors knew the contents, character, and nature
of the distributed materials, despite the claim that the defendants were unaware
that what they distributed was characterized as pornography. Id. at 123.
19951
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allow one charged with violating a child pornography regulation to
raise the affirmative defense of mistake of age. 71
In states that recognize the mistake of age defense, questions
often arise concerning the procedural aspects of raising the defense
at trial.74 Some jurisdictions require a criminal defendant to bear the
burden of production as to the affirmative defenses. 75 In these
jurisdictions, the defendant must meet a threshold burden of pro-
duction.76 Thereafter, the burden shifts to the state to prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the defense is inapplicable.7 7 Other jurisdic-
tions require the defendant to bear both the burden of production
and the burden of persuasion as to the affirmative defense.
7
1
In jurisdictions that place the burden of production on the
criminal defendant, only "some evidence" of the defense is necessary
to raise the issue at trial and, if necessary, to preserve the issue for
appeal. 79 Maryland follows those jurisdictions that place the burden
of production, but not the burden of persuasion, on a criminal
defendant to raise an affirmative defense at trial.80
III. THE INSTANT CASE
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first addressed Outmezguine's
challenge that the child pornography statute acted as a strict liability
offense and was, therefore, unconstitutional.8 ' The court relied on
Ferber 2 for its determination that Maryland had the right to regulate
sexually explicit material that depicted under-age subjects.83 The
Maryland court found, as did the Supreme Court in Ferber, that the
state had a compelling interest in protecting children and that the
state was empowered to proscribe child pornography, even if the
73. See United States v. United States Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 858
F.2d 534, 540-41 (9th Cir. 1988).
74. See generally State v. Fan, 445 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
75. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
76. Id. at 702-03.
77. Id. at 702, 703.
78. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
79. See State v. Martin, 329 Md. 351, 358, 619 A.2d 995, 995 (1993). In a previous
case, the Maryland court of appeals defined the phrase "some evidence" as it
applied to the level of production necessary to raise an affirmative defense.
Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 571 A.2d 1251 (1990). The court stated: "Some
evidence is not strictured by the test of a specific standard. It calls for no
more than what it says-'some,' as that word is understood in common,
everyday usage." Id. at 216-17, 571 A.2d at 1257.
80. See Martin, 329 Md. at 358-59, 619 A.2d at 995.
81. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 30, 641 A.2d at 875.
82. 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
83. See Outmezguine 111, 335 Md. at 35, 641 A.2d at 877-78.
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content of the materials in question did not rise to the level of
"obscene" as defined in Miller.8 4
After explaining that the state had the power to prohibit child
pornography, however, the court expressed its concern that statutes
such as section 419A had the potential to chill protected speech. 5
The court recognized the possibility that a photographer might refrain
from engaging in lawful conduct for fear that he would be subject
to severe criminal penalties.8 6 The court reaffirmed that regulations
with the potential to chill speech would be scrutinized closely"7 and
cited with approval Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment,8 and Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan.8 9
In Outmezguine v. State, the court used the Ferber balancing
test to assess the extent of overbreadth inherent in section 419A.9
The court weighed the state's interest in protecting children against
the individual's right to engage in constitutionally protected speech. 9'
Additionally, the court examined defendants' burden to ascertain the
age of their photographic subjects.9 2 Comparing the strengths of each
argument, the court held that the state's interest outweighed the
regulation's nominal impact on individual rights.93 This decision was
premised upon a belief that it was not an unwarranted burden for a
photographer to make a reasonable effort to request appropriate
identification before he photographed a subject.Y
The court then analyzed the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. United States District
84. Id. at 38, 641 A.2d at 879. For the Miller Court's definition of obscenity, see
supra note 52.
85. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 36, 641 A.2d at 878.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 35-36, 641 A.2d at 878.
88. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
89. 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (finding that the censorship activities of a legislatively
created commission violated the First Amendment).
90. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982); see text accompanying
supra notes 61-64.
91. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57 and text accompanying supra notes 61-64.
92. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 37, 641 A.2d at 878. The court determined that
a photographer, because of his unique position in the distribution chain, would
be in the best position to ascertain the true age of photographic subjects. Id.
93. Id. at 37-38, 641 A.2d at 879. Application of the balancing tests yielded the
following unequivocal statement from the court: "[W]e hold that the First
Amendment does not require scienter to be an element of the offense, nor
does it require that a reasonable mistake of age defense be available to
defendants who are prosecuted under § 419A(c)." Id. at 38, 641 A.2d at 879.
Despite this seemingly definitive pronouncement, the court continued its analysis
of the appropriateness of finding a scienter element in the statute.
94. Id. at 37, 641 A.2d at 878. The court suggested that photographers examine
driver's licenses and birth certificates before allowing individuals to participate
as subjects in sexually explicit media. Id.
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Court for Central District of California,91 which expounded the
principle that child pornography statutes were unconstitutional if, by
applying a strict liability standard for criminality, they "seriously"
chilled protected speech.9 The Ninth Circuit held that scienter need
not be an element of statutes that prohibit the photography of child
subjects engaged in explicit activity. 97 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland compared the Ninth Circuit's holding with the holding
from the Court of Appeals of Minnesota in State v. Fan.9 8 In Fan,
the Minnesota court held that the First Amendment was not offended
by a state regulation that expressly denied the availability of the
defense for mistake of age to one convicted of violating the state's
child pornography regulation."
Concluding its analysis of the constitutionality of the strict
liability regulation, the court acknowledged that some form of scien-
ter was necessary in all such regulations.' °° In Outmezguine, the court
held that only knowledge of the nature and character of the sexually
explicit materials was necessary for conviction.10' The "nature and
character" test had been formerly utilized only in cases involving the
purchase, transportation, and distribution of child pornography. 0 2
The court opined that Outmezguine need only have known that the
conduct photographed was of the type proscribed by the regulation. 03
The court warned that one who tested the boundaries of "sexual
conduct" did so at his own risk.' °4
The court then analyzed section 419A and applied traditional
rules of statutory construction. 0° Utilizing the plain language test,
95. 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988).
96. United States Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 858 F.2d at 540.
97. See United States v. United States Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 858
F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988); State v. Fan, 445 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989).
98. 445 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. App. 1989).
99. Id. at 247-48. The Fan court distinguished its holding from that of United
States Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal. by stating that the statute expressly
denied the availability of the mistake of age defense, thereby eliminating the
need for the Minnesota judiciary to determine the defense's availability. Id. at
247.
100. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982).
101. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. 20, 40, 641 A.2d 870, 880 (1994).
102. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
103. The prohibited conduct is defined in MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 416A (1992).
104. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 40, 641 A.2d at 880; see also Hamling, 418 U.S.
at 123 (finding that a defendant need not know that materials are "obscene"
to be guilty of violating a statute prohibiting such material).
105. Outmezguine I1, 335 Md. at 41, 641 A.2d at 880. In a recent Maryland case,
the court of appeals outlined many of the relevant principles of statutory
construction. See Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 632 A.2d 753 (1993). The
primary goal of statutory construction is to carry out the intent of the
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the court emphasized the law's silence as to any knowledge element.0
In response to Outmezguine's challenge that the judiciary had, on
several occasions, read scienter elements into statutes where none
existed, the court declined to rewrite the statute and determined that
the state's child pornography regulation would be treated similarly
to the state's regulation concerning statutory rape.' °7 The court
concluded that only in those situations where the legislature had
inadvertently omitted a scienter element had the judiciary felt the
necessity to create one.'0
Reading the statute as a whole, the court determined that the
General Assembly consciously omitted the scienter element.' °9 The
court recognized that the legislature included a knowledge element
in two of the companion subsections to section 419A.1 0 The court
also noted that the bill, when it was first examined by the Maryland
legislature, contained a variety of options, some containing scienter
elements and some not."' The legislature had both alternatives before
it and chose not to include a scienter element.
12
Next, the court addressed Outmezguine's contention that the
legislature, although it chose not to include a scienter element,
nonetheless wished to make available a mistake of age defense." 3
The legislative history revealed a proposed version of the 1989
amendment that would have expressly prohibited the mistake of age
defense." 4 After ACLU testimony denouncing the elimination of a
defendant's ability to raise the defense as unconstitutional, the leg-
islature removed the prohibitive language from the regulation." 5
legislature. Id. at 491, 632 A.2d at 757. In an effort to determine legislative
intent, the courts look first to the wording of a statute. Id. at 491, 632 A.2d
at 758. All provisions of a statute should be read together when determining
the regulation's intent. Id. Where the provisions of a statute are unclear, courts
look to the legislative history in an attempt to glean the legislature's true intent.
See id. at 491-92, 632 A.2d at 757-58.
106. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 41, 641 A.2d at 881.
107. Id. at 43, 641 A.2d at 881 (citing Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 585-86, 632
A.2d 797, 804 (1993)).
108. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 41-42, 641 A.2d at 881 (citing with approval
State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451, 456-57, 583 A.2d 250, 252 (1991) and
Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 645-48, 547 A.2d 1041, 1044-46 (1988)).
109. Id. at 44-45, 641 A.2d at 882.
110. Maryland holds criminally liable anyone who "knowingly" permits a minor to
engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purposes of photographic media.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A(b) (1992). Additionally, any person who
"knowingly promotes, distributes, or possesses" child pornography will be
subject to the strictures of § 419A(e).
111. See S. 248, 1978 Sess. (Md. 1978); H.R. 35, 1978 Sess. (Md. 1978).
112. Outmezguine II, 97 Md. App. 151, 162, 627 A.2d 541, 546 (1993).
113. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 46-47, 641 A.2d at 883.
114. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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Outmezguine contended that this was a clear indication of the leg-
islature's desire to incorporate the defense into the criminal statute.
1 6
Outmezguine further maintained that if an affirmative defense of
mistake of age existed, then it followed that knowledge was an
element of the offense.
1 7
The court enumerated three possible interpretations of section
419A: (1) Knowledge was not an element of the offense, and the
affirmative defense of mistake of age was not available, (2) knowledge
was not an element of the offense, but the mistake of age defense
was available, or (3) knowledge was an element of the offense that
the state had to prove in its case in chief."' The court adopted the
interpretation that it felt the legislature had intended to enact' 9 -
that scienter need not be proven but that it was possible that the
affirmative defense of mistake of age could be available to one
charged with violating the statute.
20
The court concluded its opinion by addressing Outmezguine's
preservation argument.' 2' The court determined that, although the
defense of mistake of age could be available, Outmezguine had failed
to preserve the issue of mistake of age for appeal.' 22 Outmezguine
argued that once the trial court determined that knowledge of age
was not an element of the offense, any evidence that showed rea-
sonable belief of age would have been inadmissible. 2 The court was
not persuaded and reiterated its position that if the trial judge erred,
the defense counsel was required to preserve its objection on the
record.'24
116. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 31, 641 A.2d at 876.
117. Id. at 49, 641 A.2d at 884. Outmezguine reasoned that a mistake of age
defense was "only relevant to a crime involving a culpable mental state," and
that if the court recognized the availability of the defense, the court was
necessarily recognizing a knowledge element. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 47, 641 A.2d at 883. The court never affirmatively stated that the
legislature intended that the mistake of age defense be available: "[I]t is
arguable that the [I]egislature did not want to eliminate the availability of a
mistake of age defense, but rather intended to permit a defendant indicted
under § 419A(c) to argue that he was reasonably mistaken about a child's
age." Id. (emphasis added).
120. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 47, 641 A.2d at 883.
121. Id. at 51, 641 A.2d at 886.
122. Id. at 52, 641 A.2d at 886. Outmezguine failed to raise this issue at trial. The
court did not adhere to its own standard that only "some evidence" is necessary
to raise an affirmative defense at trial. A defense sufficiently raised at trial,
but rejected, is still preserved for any subsequent appeal.
123. Id. at 51, 641 A.2d at 886.
124. Id. at 52, 641 A.2d at 886. The court determined that Outmezguine failed to
"elucidate" the record as is necessary to preserve an issue for appeal. Id.




In Outmezguine III, the court of appeals chose a close case, in
that Jennifer was not far below the age of majority, to take a tough
stance on child pornography. The court determined that the state
had the ability to regulate the speech in question and then balanced
the state's interest against the degree of the potential chilling effect
on protected speech. Although the court's constitutional analysis
followed Supreme Court precedent, 25 the court failed to decide the
most fundamental issue.
26
The court in Outmezguine III failed to affirmatively establish
whether the defense of mistake of age was available for one charged
with violating section 419A. The court stated only that "the First
Amendment does not require [the availability of such an affirmative
defense.]' ' 27 Conversely, when performing the statutory construction
analysis, the court determined that the legislative history indicated
that mistake of age might be available to a criminal defendant.
28
What the court failed to recognize was that its equivocation on the
availability of the mistake of age defense has placed many photog-
raphers who engage in legal conduct in fear of criminal liability.
Under the court's interpretation of the statute, a photographer who
diligently checks identification could still violate the regulation if the
identification provided is forged or inaccurate.
Under the court's interpretation of section 419A, a photographer
who violates the statute faces greater criminal sanctions than does a
male over the age of twenty-one who has sexual intercourse with a
fourteen year old minor. 129 The weakness of the court's interpretation
is also apparent when one compares the broad range of offenses that
are subject to the same liability. A photographer who takes photo-
graphs of a topless, seventeen year old woman faces the same penalty
as one who films sexually obscene activities that incorporate young
children. This nonsensical result can be remedied by a legislative
revamping of the current pornography statute and by modelling the
statute after the state's sexual offense provisions, 30 which recognize
different levels of culpability depending on the victim's age and the
125. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982); see text accompanying
supra notes 61-64.
126. See Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 37-38, 641 A.2d at 879.
127. Id. at 38, 641 A.2d at 879.
128. Id. at 47, 641 A.2d at 883.
129. Maryland's third degree sexual offense statute imposes incarceration of not
more than 10 years. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464B (1992 & Supp. 1995). In
contrast, violators of § 419A may be imprisoned for not more than 10 years
and, in addition, may be fined up to $25,000. Id. § 419A(e)(1).
130. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461, et seq. (1992 & Supp. 1995).
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egregiousness of the conduct.' The same type of sliding scale lia-
bility, if employed in the arena of child pornography statutes, would
produce realistic sentences that would be commensurate with defen-
dants' criminal activities.
In addition to the court's failure to definitively establish the
defense, the court ignored its own precedent in determining the
constitutional appropriateness of the mistake of age defense. It is
the Court of Appeals of Maryland's practice not to determine issues
on a constitutional basis if other factors are determinative. 3 2 Here,
the court determined that Outmezguine failed to raise the defense at
trial.'33 The defendant's deficiency should have been dispositive of
the issue; however, the court analyzed the constitutionality of the
defense and determined that the First Amendment did not require
its existence. 34 A possible interpretation of the court's action is that
it wished to leave the door open to the legislature to amend section
419A and to eliminate the possibility of the defense. A letter from
the Attorney General provided the court with further support that
the elimination of the defense was permissible.' 3 Recognizing that
the legislature struck the limiting language only after ACLU testi-
mony, the court reassured the legislature that it could eliminate the
defense without fear that the revised statute would be rejected. 3 6
While not in direct conflict with the idea of separation of powers,
the court injected its own view of the value of sexually explicit
materials and thereby created the potential of influencing the decision-
making process of the legislative branch.
The most disturbing aspect of the opinion was that it increased
the amount of evidence necessary to generate an affirmative defense
and to preserve the issue for appeal. At trial, Outmezguine testified
that he was uncertain as to Jennifer's age. 37 Historically, "some"
or any evidence of an affirmative defense was sufficient to raise the
issue at trial and to preserve it for appellate review.'38 The dissent
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Simms v. State, 288 Md. 712, 421 A.2d 957 (1980) (determining that
the court will avoid unnecessary decisions regarding constitutional issues);
Commissioner of Labor & Ind. v. Fitzwater, 280 Md. 14, 371 A.2d 137 (1977)
(stating that the court will not reach constitutional issues if other factors are
dispositive).
133. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. 20, 52, 641 A.2d 870, 886 (1994).
134. See id. at 37-38, 641 A.2d at 879.
135. Id. at 46, 641 A.2d at 883. The letter from the Attorney General's office
stated: "[LIack of knowledge need not be recognized as a defense." Letter
from Kathryn M. Rowe, Assistant Attorney General, to Delegate Anne
MacKinnon (Feb. 20, 1989).
136. Id. at 45-49, 641 A.2d at 883-85.
137. Outmezguine 11I, 335 Md. at 52, 641 A.2d at 886.
138. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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argued that the physical appearance of the victim combined with the
defendant's testimony was enough to satisfy the low hurdle of the
"some evidence" requirement.3 9 Outmezguine's assertions should
have been sufficient to meet the "some evidence" test.
4°
A more appropriate analysis would have been for the court to
make the affirmative defense of mistake of age available to the
defendant. Since the trial court failed to recognize the defense, its
decision was clearly erroneous, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland
should have remanded the case for reconsideration. At the trial level,
mistake of age would only have been available if Outmezguine had
testified that he reasonably believed Jennifer to be of the age of
majority. The burden of proof would then have shifted to the state
to prove that Outmezguine knew or should have known that Jennifer
was under eighteen years of age. In an effort to prove Outmezguine's
mental culpability, the state could have relied on the victim's state-
ments to the defendant in which she allegedly told him her age and
grade level.' 4' This type of ruling would decrease the potential chilling
effect on those who would engage in the activity of photographing
sexually explicit, non-obscene conduct that is protected by the First
Amendment. More egregious cases would not be affected, as the
physical appearance of the victim would often eliminate the possibility
of mistake of age as a defense.
V. CONCLUSION
In Outmezguine v. State (Outmezguine III) the Court of Appeals
of Maryland expressed its intolerance with producers of child por-
nography by strictly sanctioning such abhorrent conduct. Despite the
admirable goal of eliminating the harmful effects of pornography on
children, the court's holding limits the protection guaranteed by the
First Amendment. Additionally, the court failed to apply a mistake
of age defense to the statute. Assuming that an affirmative defense
exists, the court increased the standard of production necessary to
raise the issue at trial.
While it may be inadvertent, this opinion chills the production
of protected speech depicting sexually explicit conduct. It also sends
a warning to those people who continue legally to ply their trade:
Criminal liability may exist, even if the photographer is reasonably
diligent in inquiring as to the age of a potential subject. While the
state does have a legitimate interest in protecting children, it should
not do so at the expense of unsuspecting, cautious, and law-abiding
139. Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 55-56, 641 A.2d at 888 (Bell, J., dissenting).
140. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
141. See Outmezguine III, 335 Md. at 27, 641 A.2d at 873.
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citizens. The court chose to assert its judicial power in a case where
the "child" was not far from the age of majority. The result is that
the defendant, Elan Outmezguine, will be imprisoned for eight years,
even though he may have believed that his conduct was reasonable
and constitutionally protected. Outmezguine v. State (Outmezguine
III) is just another in a long series of cases that continue to erode
the fundamental constitutional freedoms guaranteed by the First
Amendment.
Charles L. Simmons, Jr.
